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If you'd like some insight into the mindset of our probable next Secretary of Defense, this makes a short introduction written by the man himself. He spends the first quarter of the book or so making because-I-said-so, in-my-opinion declarations, one couldn't really call them "arguments." He cites all-the-guys-I-know or individuals whom he won't actually name so he cites in alias. Very dependable data there.
He does eventually make some arguments, for instance indicating how General Mark Milley went along for 43 years in uniform without so much as a peep about what was wrong within the military, then suddenly declaring one day as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military is broken and had always been broken (he starts his engagement with Milley on p 18). Either Milley had been complicit all along or he was lying or exaggerating when he suddenly discovered the military's problems.
Or in another case Hegseth cites the details of the Marine Corps' study into the performance of all-men versus integrated personnel units (The Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force, which he first mentions p 75), which were not exactly what the Obama administration was hoping for at the time. The book then transitions mostly into memoir, which at least is insightful insofar as it illuminates Hegseth's own experiences. Yes, he addresses his controversial tattoo, too.
Perhaps what I found most frightening about the book was his consistent description of the 40+ percent of America that disagrees with Hegseth's politics as "domestic enemies" (p 2), "just like an enemy at war" (p 3), "They're traitors. Plain and simple." (p 108) His referring to those he disagrees with as merely a "freak squad" (p 9) gets as complimentary as he can. When I wore the uniform, I wore it to kill and possibly die for all Americans, including those who disagreed with or even despised me. I wonder if Hegseth really wanted to kill and die for his "enemies." I wonder if he will lead and manage the entire Department of Defense to defend that half of America, too, or if he will treat them as the enemies and traitors he is convinced they are.
As noted, the early part of the book if red meat for the deep red base. Instead of making arguments, Hegseth shoots from the hip and engages in intellectually lazy techniques like "Prove me wrong." (p 9, emphasis in original) Normally it's up to an author to actually suggest why he might be right, aside from because-I-said-so. Then again, why would Hegseth show any concern for constructing logically sound arguments citing empirical evidence? His praetorian disdain for intellectuals exceeds even that which he has for those who create wealth or add value in the private sector. Toward the end of the book, Hegseth goes for gold with: "Our covenant is broken. Our next president has one last chance to repair it." (p 208) One last chance? Really Pete? Nowhere in the book does he even attempt to support that provocative and apocalyptic assertion. He just throws that at the reader and keeps right on going with other points, paying so little attention to it himself one can't help but realize how unserious Hegseth is.
Hegseth's critics have often accused him of white extremism/nationalism, which Hegseth does a pretty good job of putting to bed. His admiration for the DoD racially integrating in advance of the rest of American society, his admiration for his non-white colleagues, his citing of a black intellectual (gasp! Hegseth even reads intellectuals!), etc., show that he is at least not openly and consciously some kind of white supremacist. One did not see Nazis speaking or writing like this. There may be plenty to criticize about Hegseth, but one wonders why his critics feel the need to reach for an argument their own inability to prove risks undermining other messages they may have by association.
Conversely, the fact that Hegseth manages to construct two actual arguments in the book shows that he has this capacity, but is either too lazy to employ it elsewhere or perhaps is unable to muster up sufficient evidence or construct a logically valid argument in favor of his other positions. I, for one, firmly believe he could and have seen others do so (of course, I have seen still others attack these arguments and construct alternative arguments of their own). While his lazy method of declaring things to be so because he said so keeps the book mercifully short, he might at least be able to sway a few among the uncommitted if he bothered.
If you're looking for serious arguments concerning America's culture wars, especially those involving the military, I would go somewhere else. If you'd like to know what's in the head of our apparently next Secretary of Defense, well, it's short and it's not difficult reading, so yes, start here. Once you find out what's in Hegseth's head, you may have your own questions or concerns.